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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
EhXPANDING PERMISSIBLE BASES OF JURISDICTION" IN MISSOURI:
TftE NEW LONG-ARM STATUTE'
I. INTODUCTION
-The 1967 Regular Session of the'. 74th General Assembly enacted a new statute
which provides five bases2 for jurisdiction over nonresidents other than by personal
services within Missouri. The purposes of this -article are to determine: (1) the
scope of this statute, (2) its applicability to causes of action arising before the
effective date of. the statute, and (3) the relationship of the long-arm statute to
other Missouri statutes which provide for substituted service on certain nonresidents.
The extent to which the new long-arm statute will broaden Missouri's jurisdiction
over nonresidents ultimately depends upon the court's treatment of future cases
in light of past Missouri decisions4 and decisions from other jurisdictions construing
substantially similar statutes.5 The construction of the Illinois long-arm .statute
1. §§ 506.500-.520, RSMo 1967 Supp.
2. § 506.500, RSMo 1967 Supp.:
1. Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident. of this
state, or any corporation, who in person or through an agent does any of
the acts enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person, firm, or
corporation, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the
jurisdiction of-the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising
from the doing of any such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state;
(2) The making of any contract within this state;
(3) The commission of a tortious act within this state;
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this state;
(5) The contracting to insure any person, property or risk
located within this state at the time of contracting.
2. Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated in this sec-
tion may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which juris-
diction over him is based upon this section. Mo. Laws 1967, p. - , S.B.
No. 130, § 1.
3. § 506.510(1), RSMo 1967 Supp.:
1. Service of process upon any person who is subject to the juris-
diction of the courts of this state, as provided in section 506.500, may be
made by personally serving the process upon the defendant outside this
state, or upon a corporation by serving the process upon a managing
officer or any person or corporation who shall be designated as a registered
agent by such corporation in any of the several states, and shall have
the same force and effect as though the process had been served within
this state.
4. See, e.g., Anderson, Personal Jurisdiction Over Outsiders, 28 Mo. L. REv.
336, 368-382 (1963).
5. Ten years after the decision in International Shoe v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), Illinois enacted a statute allowing jurisdiction over nonresidents
by outstate service of process. Following the Illinois lead, many states have adopted
long-arm statutes in the Illinois pattern. The author has placed particular emphasis
on Illinois cases because the Missouri statute is drafted in nearly identical lan-
guage. Other statutes have been referred to for the purpose of comparing the
language used in various provisions with that used by the Missouri statute.
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i& particularly pertinent since the Missouri statute was consciously patterned after
the Illinois statute.6
I. THE ComMoN LAW CONCEPT OF JURIsDIcTION OVER NONRESIDENTS
According to the doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff," due process required personal
service of process within the forum state to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident.
This stri ct concept of "physical power" first began to give way when the Supreme
Court upheld a state statute prohibiting the use of its highways by nonresidents
until such nonresident appointed the secretary of state as his agent for process
for any actions arising out of such use.8 A later case9 held that a nonresident
motorist statute based on the "implied consent" of a nonresident individual to be
served through the secretary of state was within the bounds of due process. In
exercising jurisdiction over foreigni corporations by substituted service, the courts
justified their decisions in terms of the corporation's "presence" or "doing business'
within the forum state.10 However, an individual, unlike a corporation, could not
be excluded altogether from doing business in another state without violating the
privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution. Therefore, systematic or
continuous activities within the forum would not sustain jurisdicton over a non-
resident individual unless he was personally served in the forum state."1 This
theory was later repudiated'2 in a case upholding jurisdiction over a nonresident
individual dealing in corporate securities under a statute permitting service of
process on the district manager, in spite of the clear absence of authority to receive
process.
The "fall of the citadel," as far as "the requirements of due process in the
exercise of personal jurisdiction beyond the territorial limits of the state, was
heralded by the landmark case of Iternzational S oe Co. v. Washington.j3 In order
to satisfy due process, a foreign corporation need only have "minimum contacts"
with the state "... such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."" 4 International Shoe is signifi-
cant in that the court abandoned the conceptualistic approach to in personam
6. State Senator William B. Waters stated that: "This law was represented
as being virtually identical to a similar law adopted by the State of Illinois which,
it is said, has been held to be constitutional." Waters, State Legislative Develop-
ments, 23 J. Mo. BAR 452, 455 (Oct. 1967). See also note 22 infra.
7. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
8. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
9. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
10. E.g., Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939);
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
11. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
12. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14. Id. at 316. The court allowed the State of Washington to recover unpaid
contributions to the state's unemployment compensation fund from a shoe manu-
facturer, incorporated under the laws of Delaware, who had salesmen continuously
soliciting'orders in the state even though the corporation neither maintained an
office nor niade any contracts within the state.
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jurisdiction in favor of a practical approach which bases the exercise of jurisdiction
on fundamental fairness and reasonableness. Rather than setting out a specific
test, the case destroyed the doctrine under which the court had looked for fictional
"presence" and "consent."
International Shoe laid the foundation for further expansion of jurisdiction
over nonresidents 15 in subsequent cases.18 McGee v. International Life Insurance
C0.17 extended the limits of due process to a single transaction in which the
defendant's only contacts were mailing a reinsurance contract to its lone insured
in California and receiving annual premiums from him. While it might thus seem
that the significance of state boundaries has been completely abolished, substituted
service of process on nonresidents has been limited: (1) by requiring that form
of service which is most likely to lead to actual notice;18 (2) by refusing to
allow substituted service in certain actions such as alimony decrees; 19 and (3)
by insisting that the nonresident defendant's contact with the forum state arise
out of a "purposeful act.' 20
15. There is authority for the propositions that the "minimum contacts"
rationale of International Shoe also applies to individuals. In Owens v. Superior
Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 831, 345 P.2d 921, 924-25 (1959) Justice Traynor stated:
The rationale of the International Shoe case is not limited to foreign
corporations, and both its language and the cases sustaining jurisdiction
over nonresident motorists make clear that the minimum contacts test
for jurisdiction applies to individuals as well as foreign corporations. It is
now settled that jurisdiction over nonresident motorists does not rest on
consent but on their activity in the state.
16. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952);
Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n., 339 U.S. 643
(1950).
17. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
18. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (extending M dlane
requirements to a condemnation proceeding); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (service by publication not binding on beneficiaries
of common trust fund whose names and addresses were known); Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457 (1940) (personal service binding on domiciliary while temporarily
outside state); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) (service by publication
not binding on domiciliary who left state without intent to return).
19. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957). The Court held that al-
though Nevada could render a valid decree of divorce ex parte, the court could
not extinguish the non-resident wife's right to alimony without personal service
of process on her in Nevada.
20. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). This case involved a Delaware
trustee of an inter vivos trust executed in Delaware. The settlor moved to Florida
eight years before her death where she corresponded with the trustee and received
trust income by mail. These were the trustee's only contacts with Florida. The
validity of two powers of appointment executed by the settlor was the subject of
the action. The Court held that in the absence of personal service in Florida, the
Delaware trustee was not bound by the proceedings. In support of its holding, the
Court stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a non-
resident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
forum state. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that
,there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus involving the
benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, supra at 253.
[Vol. 33
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II. THE ScOPE OF THE LONG-ARM STATUTE
The "minimum contacts" rationale of International Shoe provided the impetus
for statutes extending jurisdiction over nonresidents. 21 Undoubtedly, the purpose
of the long-arm statute is to make it easier for Missouri residents to litigate their
claims against outsiders in Missouri courts.22 The idea is that if a nonresident
performs a purposeful act which has a substantial connection with a Missouri
resident, it is fair and reasonable that he answer for his conduct in the courts of this
state. Exactly how far the statute authorizes Missouri courts to extend jurisdiction
and yet remain consistent with the requirements of due process is an open
question. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Missouri courts to look to the
interpretation of similar statutes by our sister states. Unfortunately, the effort to
liberalize jurisdiction over nonresidents may be frustrated by the overly conserva-
tive interpretation given to International Slwe by the Missouri courts in the past.m
Before considering the scope of the five jurisdictional bases, there are some
features of the statute which should be carefully considered even though they
may seem obvious. As the introductory paragraph clearly states, section 506.500
applies to individuals (including their personal representatives) as well as to
corporations.24 Also, a person or corporation performing any one of the acts pro-
vided for alone or througk an agent is amenable to Missouri jurisdiction by
substituted service. An important requirement is that the cause of action must
arise out of one of the enumerated acts.25 Furthermore, the statute contemplates
both residents and nonresidents. And finally, the required form of notice is
personal service outside the state.2 6
A. The Transaction of Any Business
Although International Shoe destroyed fictional concepts of jurisdiction and
said that "minimum contacts" would satisfy due process, the pre-long-arm Mis-
souri cases have expressed a reluctance to accept the full breadth of the opinion.
21. Supra note 5.
22. Discussing the similar Illinois long-arm statute in Haas v. Fancher
Furniture Co., 156 F.Supp. 564, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1957), the Court said inter alia:
There cannot be any doubt that it was the intention of the drafters of this
section to assert the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois over nonresident
defendants to the fullest extent permissible under . . . Due Process . . .
and the Illinois Constitution ...
23. See Anderson, supra note 4.
24. There was some doubt as to whether the "minimum contacts" rationale
applied to individuals. Supra note 14. § 506.500 leaves no doubt that its coverage
extends to individuals as well as corporations.
25. § 506.500(2), RSMo 1967 Supp. Prior Missouri cases have insisted that
". the circumstance that the injury arose out of corporate activity within the
state is an important factor in determining jurisdiction.' Simpkins v. Council Mfg.
Corp., 332 F.2d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 1964). Accord, Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320
F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963); Pucci v. Blatz Brewing Co., 127 F. Supp. 747 (W.D.
Mo. 1955); Hayman v. Southern Pacific Co., 278 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1955). -
26. § 506.510(1), RSMo 1967 Supp., supra note 3. This type of service of
process should be. adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process. See cases
cited, supra note 18; cf. Mo. R. Crv. P. 54 .07 (a), 54.08(a).
1968]
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In order to be amenable .to Missouri jurisdiction, the Missouri courts have in-
sisted that a foreign corporation must be,"doing business"27 in the state, -which
requires "... something more than the minimum compliance with federal due
process .... ',28 Jurisdiction was refused where the defendant's contacts with the
state were characterized as "mere solicitation" 29 or only amounted to a single
isolated act.30 For a nonresident to be subject to Missouri jurisdiction, his activi-
ties here had to rise to the level of a continuous course of business 31 under the
label of "solicitation plus." 32
The courts themselves have not agreed as to how far they would assert juris-
diction over nonresidents in light of Internationol Shoe. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri said that "Missouri does not assert the
full constitutional breadth of process power."33 Three years later, the same court
stated that "Missouri has expressed a willingness to extend its jurisdiction over
foreign corporations to the limits allowed within the bounds of due process."'3 4 To
confuse their position even further, a subsequent opinion by the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit found no intention by the Missouri Court to extend juriF-
diction to the maximum extent allowed by due process.35
Hopefully, the phrase "transaction of any business" will be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the liberal purpose of section 506.500. Illinois wasted
little time in recognizing that their long-arm statute and process act reflected-
, a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the
extent permitted by the due process clause." 36 Therefore, the "transaction of any
business" could not be given the same restrictive interpretation as the old "doing
business" cases. 37 Their court has upheld jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
27. See Simpkins v. Council Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 1964).
After reviewing past cases, the court concluded that Missouri still applies the
"doing business" test instead of the minimal contacts standards. A later case indi-
cated a possible change in attitude by recognizing McGee as ". . . an illustration
of the ever-shrinking conception of the standards required for outside service of
process." State ex rel. M. Pressner & Co. v. Scott, 387 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo. En
Banc 1965). See also Slivka v. Hackley, 418 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1967).
28. Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64, 72 (8th Cir. 1963).
29. See, e.g., Long v. Victor Products Corp., 297 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1961);
Shannon v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 167 F. Supp. 493 (W.D. Mo.
1958); Hayman v. Southern Pacific Co., 278 S..2d 749 (Mo. 1955).
30. Collar v. Peninsular Gas Co., 295 S§W.2d 88 (Mo. 1956). Plaintiff, a
Kansas resident doing business in Missouri, brought this action against a Michigan
corporation for malicious prosecution arising out of a prior suit initiated by the
defendant in Missouri. Presumably, today, jurisdiction would be sustained under
either § 506.500, RSMo 1967 Supp. or § 351.633, RSMo 1965 Supp. See text infra
Part III C.
31. See Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc
1963).
32. Wooster v. Trimont Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 682, 203 S.W.2d 411 (1947).
33.' Pucci v. Blatz Brewing Co., 127 F. Supp. 747, 750 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
34. Shannon v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., supra note 29 at 494.
35. Simpkins v. Council Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 1964), citing
Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Co., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
36. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957); see also
Berlemann v. Superior Distributing Co., 17 Ill. App.2d 522, 151 N.E.2d 116 (1958),
37. Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
[WI";''.3
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whose only contacts were through an agent who secured purchase orders for vend-
ing machines in Illinois. 38 A breach of warranty arose out of and was directly
connected with defendant's activity in Illinois; and the securing of the orders by
its employees plus the promise to send an employee to train plaintiff constituted
sufficient "minimum contacts." 39 The execution of an employment contract4 0 also
satisfied the "transaction of any business" but the court, in this case, refused to
exercise jurisdiction beyond the limits of due process where the nonresident's con-
tacts were fortuitous rather than purposeful4 ' and where the defendant's alleged
contacts with the state really amounted to the unilateral activity of the plaintiffs. 42
. Other courts .have been equally liberal in their definitions of what constitutes
transacting business within the state. Even the solicitation of orders by mail has
been enough to make a nonresident corporation amenable to jurisdiction by service
of process outside the state 43 Nonresident manufacturers who personally serviced,
their product44 or sent salesmen to investigate a defect45 were also held to answer
for breach of warranty in the consumer's state in spite of the fact that sales were
made through independent brokers or dealers.
Thus, even a single act has been considered the equivalent of transacting
business. Such a broad definition would be a radical departure from the old "doing
business" requirements in MissourL It is doubtful whether the Missouri courts
-ned go this far though since we have four other wubsections, each of which
can independently support jurisdiction and would be rendered somewhat meaning-
less by making "transacting of any business" an all-encompassing provision.
B. The Making of Any Contract
The language of this provision seems to be the iost straight-forward of all
the subsections and leaves little room for speculation as to what acts would be
covered thereunder. Although the execution of a single contract in Missouri may
have previously been vulnerable to attack under a plea of "mere solicitation,"
this is no longer the case. The Illinois courts, on the other hand, have had to stretci
"transacting business" since their act does not have a "making of any contract"
provision.
Other long-arm process acts have a provision covering nonresidents who
enter into a contract to supply services .or furnish materials within the state46
38. Berlemann v. Superior Distributing Co., 17 Ill. App.2d 522, 151 N.E.2d
116 (1958).
39. Id. at 526, 151 N.E.2d at 118.
40. Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Illinois
does not provide a jurisdictional base for "the making of any contract" as does
the Missouri statute.
41- Kaye-Martin v. Brooks, 267 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959).
42. Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas Co., 249 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957).
43. Green v. U.S. Chewing Gum Mfg. Co., 224 F.2d 369 (5th Cit. 1955).
44. Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
45. S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954).
46. See, e.g., MoNT. R. Civ. P. 4B (1) (e) (Supp. 1965);.UNFoRM INTERSTATE
AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE Acr § 1.03(a) (2) (1962); VA. CobE AiN. § 81
81.2(a) (2) (Supp. 1964); Wis STAT. § 262.05(5) (Supp. 1963).
1968] ,
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or contracts to be performed in whole or in part within the state 4 7 The emphasis
there is on the location of ultimate performance of the contract rather than the
place where the contract is made. A literal interpretation of that type of provision
would allow enforcement of a wholly executory contract where no act has been
performed in the state asserting jurisdiction. Section 506.500 contemplates that the
parties perform a definite physical act in the forum by requiring that the execution
of the contract takes place in Missouri.
C. The Commission of A Tortios Act
The interpretation of this provision is likely to cause the most difficulty. Its
vague language does not suggest the answers to several varied situations which
have arisen in other jurisdictions. Yet while there are questions about the scope
of the statute, the courts in other jurisdictions have not felt that there are serious
due process questions arising from the assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of a
single tort.
In Nelson v. Miller,48 an Illinois plaintiff brought an action in Illinois against
a Wisconsin resident whose employee allegedly injured the plaintiff while delivering
a stove in Illinois. Jurisdiction over the Wisconsin resident was found not to be
a denial of due process. A similar conclusion was reached in Smytl& v. Twin State
Improvement Corp.,49 where plaintiff brought an action for damages allegedly
caused by the defendant foreign corporation in re-roofing his house. Both cases
note the availability of forum non-convenien. o in cases of extreme hardship but
both concluded that normally the most convenient forum will be where the
tortious act occurs.
In both cases discussed above, the negligent act of the nonresident defendant
and the resulting injury to the plaintiff took place in the forum state. Difficult
questions of construction arise when one of these takes place outside the forum
state. When the negligent act or omission occurs in Missouri and the injury occurs
in another state, the applicability of the statute depends upon whether the words
"tortious act" mean the last act necessary to render the actor liable or the negligent
act or omission which gave rise to the injury. In determining the applicable sub-
stantive law, Missouri courts define the place of tort as the place where the in-
jury occurred. 6' However, the statute does not say "tort"; it say "tortious act."
Furthermore, one of the leading conflicts scholars has warned that it is dangerous
to assume that the definition of a word which appears in two entirely different
rules has the same meaning and scope in both contexts. 52 The comment to the
Uniform Act, which uses language similar to the Missouri statute, suggests that
47. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1957); VT. STAT. tit. 12, ci.
855 (1947); see Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
48. 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
49. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
50. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 391, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680 (1957); Smyth v.
Twin State Improvement Corp., supra note 49 at 574, 80 A.2d at 667.
51. Hughes Provision Co. v. LaMear Poultry & Egg Co., 242, S.W.2d 285 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1951).
52. CooK, THE LoGIcAL AND LEGAL. BASES OF CONFLict OF LAWS 159 (1942).
[VOLi 33
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jurisdiction should be sustained in this situation.5 3 It seems probable, therefore,
that the statute will be construed to confer jurisdiction where the negligent act
or omission takes place in Missouri even through the resulting injury occurs
elsewhere.
The converse of the above situation, i.e., when the negligent act or omission
takes place outside Missouri and the injury occurs within the state, has given rise
to conflicting decisions. Apparently, Illinois favors a broad interpretation. In
Cray v. A-nwrican Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,5- a foreign corpoation
which manufactured safety valves in Ohio was held subject to jurisdiction in
Illinois in an action brought for injuries sustained from the explosion of a hot
water heater. The safety valves were incorporated into the product which was
manufactured in Pennsylvania and subsequently sold to the Illinois consumer. The
court reasoned that to be tortious an act must cause injury. Therefore, the place
of wrong is where the last event which is necessary to render the actor liable takes
place. Notwithstanding the fact that defendant had no agent or employee in
Illinois, the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable as long as the act itself had a
substantial connection with the forum state.55
Gray is in conflict with Helriegal v. Sears Roebuck & Co.66 where the federal
district court held that Illinois could not assume jurisdiction over a nonresident
manufacturer whose allegedly defective lawn mower was purchased by the plain-
tiff from Sears. The court concluded that since the acts constituting the alleged
tort occurred outside Illinois and the manfacturer had abandoned all control of
the article after'it left the plant, a proper interpretation of the words "tortious act"
required that both the act and the consequence thereof occur in Illinois. 57
The *conflict appears to have been resolved in MdMahon v. Boeing Airplane
Co58 Jurisdiction was sustained in an action by a stewardess who suffered injuries
as a result of defendant's alleged negligence in design and construction of an air-
craft. The defendant had no office in Illinois, and the aircraft was manufactured,
tested, sold and delivered outside the state. The federal district court felt bound
to follow Illinois law in this diversity action and thus adopted the approach taken
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Gray.
Litigation in the area of products liability often involves a local plaintiff with
a cause of action against a nonresident manufacturer. If the resident plaintiff
were forced to bring his claim in the state where the defective product was manu-
factured, the costs and other complications could be prohibitive in many cases.1 9
53. Comment, UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROcEDuRE Acr
§ 1.03(a)(3) (1962); see also Wis. STAT. § 262.05(3) (Supp. 1963).
54. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
55. Id. at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
56. 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
57. Id. at 721.
58. 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Il1. 1961).
59. "Unless they are applied in recognition of the changes brought about by
technological and economic progress, jurisdictional concepts which may have been
reasonable enough in a simpler economy lose their relation to reality, and injustice
rather than justice is promoted." Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp,, 2.2 Ill.2d 432, 443, -176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
19681
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss2/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The courts are aware of these pioblems and have sustained- jurisdictidn in a num-
ber of situations 0 where products were sold by nonresident 'imnufacturers through.
independent dealers rather than directly or through an agent But in finding no
violation of due process, these courts have emphasized that the foreign corporations.
have also maintained sufficient contacts with the forum state either by continuous
solicitation or sales'of their product, or the reasonable expectation that their prod-
ucts would be used in the forum. 61
In most of these cases'the activity of the nonresident manufacturer was
sufficient to rise to the level of "doing 'business." Some long-arm statutes hae
a separate provision for tortious acts outside the state with the further require-
ment that there be some reasonable connection between the state and the non-
resident defendant.0 2 There is some suggestion 3 that it 'is not necessary that this
activity amount to "doing business" but is sufficient if (a) defendant regularly
advertises his products or services in the state or (b) carries on some other con-
tinuous course of activity or (c) derives substantial revenue from goods supplied
or services performed in the state. Nevertheless, any pre-requisite of continuous
activity is necessarily more restrictive than the Illinois approach in Gray which
only' requires that the single isolaied act itself has a substantial connection with
the forum state. That event, the injury to the plaintiff, provides sufficient contact
ta allow service of process on the defendant outside of the forum.0 4 The Gray
rationale may be vulnerable to constitutional attack, however, unless the plaintiff
pleads sufficient facts to demonstrate that the defendant has yielded to the jurisdic-
ti6n of the forum state by purposefully performing an act there. Since it is some-
times difficult to describe defendant's conduct as a purposeful act in products
liability cases, the courts may be willing to assert jurisdiction where plaintiff can
at least show that the defendant could have anticipated a market for his products
in the forum and is thereby causally responsible for the presence of.the injuring
agency.05
60. See, e.g., Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 204 F. Supp. 117(S.D. Ind. 1962) (explosion of gas hot water heater); Becker v. General Motors,
167 F. Supp. 164 (D. Md. 1958) (malfunction of auto bumper); Adamek v.
Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961) (defective door);
Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959) (explosion of
gas hot water heater); Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App.2d'
211, 325 P.2d 21 (1958) (fire in an incubator). ut 'see O'Brien v. Comstock
Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963) (glass in a can of beans).
61. Ibid.
62. See UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT § 1.03,(a)(4) (1962); Wis. STAT. § 262.05(4) (Supp. 1963).
63. E.g., Comment, UNIFORM Acr § 1.03(a)(4) (1962); see also VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-81.2(a) (4) (Supp. 1964).
64. Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 ('1961).
65. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963) sug-
gests that the court will not infer that defendant has yielded to the court's juris-
didtion by a purposeful act or active participation in the market. Although
defendant's motion to dismiss was grahted, the court allowed plairntiff leave" to"
amend his complaint in order to make'the necessary allegations of ju7risdiction. -" :
[Vol. 33
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Whether Missouri accepts Gray in cases involving toriioui acts committed
outside the state or decides to impose some additional requirement of activity within
the state depends to some extent on the effect of sections 351.633, RSMo 1965
Supp., in cases involving foreign corporations. Under that statute, a foreign corpo
ration which commits a tort, except libel and slander, in whole or in part in Mis-
souri is deemed to be "doing business" for the purpose of substituted service of
process. The use of the words "in whole or in part" suggests that tortious acts
committed outside the state would be within the scope of the statute. The bare
language of section 506.500 does not convey the same intent. But the long-arm
statute does not purport to repeal or supercede any existing statutes. Presumably,
therefore, in products liability cases, the clearest means of obtaining jurisdiction
over the nonresident corporate manufacturer would seem to be by service under
section 351.633. With respect to nonresident individuals, their amenability to
jurisdiction under the long-arm statute depends solely upon the courts determina-
tion of the scope of "the commipsion of a tortious act within this state." It can
be argued that since the legislature specifically used the language "in whole or in
pare' in a previous corporation statute, the fact that such language was omitted
in the new long-arm statute evidences an intent not to assert jurisdiction over
nonresident individuals unless the tortious act itself occurs in Missouri.
Assuming that section 351.633 does impliedly restrict the sc6pe of section
506.500, an interesting problem may, be raised concerning actions of libel and
slander as the former statute specifically excludes such actions. In WSAZ, Inc. v.
Lyons, 6 6 a West Virginia television station, broadcasting regular programs into
Kentucky, was held subject to jurisdiction in Kentucky via substituted service in
a libel action arising out of a news broadcast. The court believed there were sub-
stantial contacts with Kentucky based on WSAZ's solicitation and execution of
contracts for the sale of advertising within Kentucky.67 Another case68 allowed
jurisdiction over a foreign publishiig corporation which had published plaintiff's
pictures in magazines distributed in the forum where such pictures allegedly
constituted an invasion of privacy.
A restrictive construction of section 506.500 for tortious acts covered by sec-
tion 351.633 and then a liberal interpretation in cases of libel and slander or other
acts not covered thereby would be anamolous. This provision of the long-arm
statute should be given an independent interpretation consistent with the needs of
justice in a highly mobile and technological society without distinguishing between
corporations and individuals.
66. 254 F.2d 242 -(6th Cir. 1958).
67. Id. at 247.
68. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955). Other
courts have not been persuaded that the distribution of newspapers is enough of A
purposeful act to bring the nonresident orporation within the jurisdiction of the
state; see Schmidt v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 384 U.S. 819 (1954); Insull 'v.
New York World Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959); Putnam v. Tri-
angle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S;E.2d 445 (1957).
257..1968]
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D. The Ownership, Use, or Possession of any Real Estate
Missouri, Illinois, and the Uniform Act have limited this section to real
property.69 On the other hand, the Montana statute 0 says "any" property and
Wisconsin 7 ' includes both real and personal property. Problems associated with
stolen property, conditional sales, and chattel mortgages present a reason for ex-
cluding personal property as a basis of jurisdiction.72
What would be the result if a Missouri resident executes a contract for the
sale of Missouri land to a California purchaser and the buyer later defaults? Is
the Missouri resident entitled to a decree for specific performance in Missouri if
the buyer is personnally served in California? The buyer would have an equitable
interest in the land, but the statute requires ownership. On the basis of in rem
jurisdiction over the property, the Missouri resident could only bring an action
to remove any "cloud" on his title.73 The Montana statute74 is broader in scope
as it covers the ownership, possession, use or any interest therein of property within
the state. Under that provision, an equitable interest would seem to be enough
to subject a nonresident individual to the jurisdiction of the forum. Although equit-
able ownership may not be sufficient to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident
buyer under the Missouri counterpart, it is arguable that jurisdiction could
be based on the "making of any contract" provision if the contract had been
executed in Missouri.
E. The Contracting to Insure any Person, Property, or Risk
Similar provisions 75 appear in most long-arm statutes including Illinois, Vir-
ginia, and the Uniform Act. Under the aegis of McGee v. Internationd Life Ins.
Co., such provisions should be sustained when attacked on due process grounds.
Missouri emphasizes the location of the person, property, or risk at the time of
contracting. Wisconsin70 takes a different approach in the comparable provision
of their long-arm statute. Rather than basing jurisdiction on the location of the
person or thing insured at the time of contracting, Wisconsin looks to the domicile
of the insured at the time when the cause of action arises.
The Wisconsin provision is more likely to effectuate the general purpose of
the long-arm statutes which is to accord the residents of a particular state wider
access to their own state courts in suits against nonresidents. By basing jurisdiction
on the location of the person or thing insured at the time of contracting, the
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 17(1)(c) (Supp. 1965); UNIFORM INTERSTATE
AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03 (a) (5) (1962).
70, MoNT. R. Civ. P. 4B(1) (c) (Supp. 1965).
71. Wis. STAT. § 262.05(6) (Supp. 1963).
72. See Comment, UNIFORM ACT § 1.03(a)(5) (1962).
73. Cf. Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.08(a); see generally Note, 44 IOWA L. REv. 374
(1959).
74. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(c) (Supp. 1965).
75. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 § 17(1)(d) (Supp. 1965); UNIFORM INTERNA-
rIONAL AND INTERSTATE PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03 (a) (6) (1962); VA. CODE ANNm.
§ 8-81.2(7) (Supp. 1964).
76. Wis. STAT. § 262.05(10) (Supp. 1963).
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Missouri provision, if carried to its logical extreme, could have the effect of opening
the Missouri courts to nonresidents (whose person or property was in Missouri
when originally insured) in their claims against foreign insurance companies 7
No doubt this result was not anticipated by the drafters of the statute.
In Washington v. Western Empire Life Ins. Co.,78 a Missouri resident sought
to collect the proceeds of a life insurance policy from a Colorado insurance company
on a policy sold and executed in Missouri. The agent had sold the policy without
the company's authorization. The court denied jurisdiction based on substituted
service on the ground that the legislature did not intend to assert jurisdiction over
a defendant who was unaware that a policy had been issued. One wonders whether
the same result would be reached under the long-arm statute. Even if the company
is not ultimately liable, a policy was issued on the life of a Missouri resident; and,
thus, the defendant would have fulfilled the literal requirements of the statute.
The plaintiff should be entkiled to litigate the issue of implied authority in a Mis-
souri court. The facts necessary to allege jurisdiction should not be dependent
upon the facts which must be proved to establish liabilityJ 9
IV. SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS
A. Tolling Statutes
The long-arm statute makes no reference to the applicability of the tolling
statute8 0 It is logical to suspend the running of the statute of limitations while
the defendant is absent from the state in those actions where the defendant must
be personally served in the state. But in causes of action where jurisdiction is
based on the long-arm statute, the defendant, whether a resident or nonresident,
will always be amenable to local jurisdiction by service of process outside the
state s8 Hence, there is no need to toll the statute of limitations. Since one cannot
be sure of the court's approach at this point, the cautious lawyer will not rely
on the existence of the tolling statute as a license to postpone timely filing of his
dlent's claim where the defendant would be amenable to jurisdiction under the
long-arm statute.
B. Retrospective Effect?
In characterizing their long-arm statute as merely establishing a new mode
of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the court in Nelson v.
77. For example, suppose a Missouri resident purchases a policy with a Florida
insurance company covering certain valuable paintings. The insured later moves to
Arkansas where the paintings are damaged. Assume Arkansas does not have a
long-arm statute or any insurance code which would allow jurisdiction over the
Florida insurer. The insured would not have to bring his claim in Florida. The
property insured was located in Missouri at the time of contracting. Therefore,
the Florida insurer would be amenable to Missouri jurisdiction in an action by the
Arkansas plaintiff.
78. 298 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1962).
79. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 391-395, 143 N.E.2d 673,' 680-682
(1957).
80. § 516.200, RSMo 1959.
81. Cf. Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.07(a).
1968]
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss2/5
MISSOURI"LAW REVIEW
Miller8 2 promptly 'decided* that the Illinois. statute would be given, retrospective
effect. The'court concluded that the statute is. procedural and just secures existing
fights rather than creating. a new cause, of action. This same reasoning prevailed
in Owens v. Superior Courts3 where it was decided that the defendant possessed
nO vested right to have the jurisdiction of the California court remain unchanged.
In that case, the defendant was a California resident when his dog bit the plaintiff,
also a California resident. When the suit was filed, defendant had become a
resident of Arizona, but California then had a statute permitting personal service
outside the state and the statute was applied retroactively.
By no means has there been universal agreement that these statutes are to be
given restrospective effect. One argument for prospective application is the lack
of unequivocal language in the statute embracing past transactions.8 4 Another is
that the statute is substantive in character since the decision to exercise jurisdic-
tion may result in the application of forum law depending on the court's Approach
to choice of .law.8 5 The Missouri court in State ex rel. Clay Equipment Corp. v.
Jensen8 o employed both of these arguments in holding that a statute allowing
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation committing a tort within the state applied
prospectively only. Because the statute used the word "commits" instead of "has
committed" and the use of "shall," the court believed that "... the statute
evidences an intention to look to the future."sT The court went on to find that the
statute was substantive in character:
We have heretofore held that ... the Legislature intended the Act to
be prospective in its application; and that to hold otherwise would make
the section unconstitutional and v;oid, because it would change the
legal effect of past actions and would impose new duties and attach new
disabilities in respect to transactions or considerations already past.88
82. 11 11.2d 378, 382, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (1957); accord, Hellriegal v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957); Haas v. Fancher Furniture
Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1957); see also Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543,
99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
83. 52 Cal.2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959).
84. See, e.g., Nevins v. Revlon, Inc., 23 Conn. Supp. 314, 317, 182 A.2d 634,
636 (1962).
85. The author has not attempted to cover the companion area of choice of
law. However, it is important to realize that the exercise of jurisdiction may lead
to the application of local law to the particular controversy. This would be par-
ticularly true if Missouri were to embrace the local law theory of Professor Currie.
See, e.g., CURRiE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1965). The Re-
statement approach in applying the law of the state with the most significant re-
lationship to the parties and the occurrence would theoretically produce a uniform
result regardless of the forum. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF
LAWS, § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). For a discussion of the current Missouri
position on choice of law, see McPheeters, Choice of Laws-New Missouri Ap-
proach ?, 32 Mo. L. REV. 392 (1967); Northrip, Choice of Law Rides in Tort Cases-
A Coming Conflict in Missouri, 33 Mo. L. REV. 81 (1968).
86. 363 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
87. Id. at 669. See also State ex rel. Mercantile National Bank at Dallas v.
Rooney, 402 S.W.2d 354, 360 (Mo. En Banc 1966).
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However, .the. provision dealing with the manner of notification in what is es-
sentially ine same statute was recently, found to be procedural arid was given
retrospective effect 89 The stafus of' causes 'of "action which arose before the
effective date of the long-arm statute will depend on judicial pronouncement as to
whether this statute is merely procedural dr actually changes the legal effect of
,past actions. It is not likely though. that. a nonresident, defendant would have
relied on a. particular, court exercising jurisdiction and applying the law -of that
state before deciding to perform, a certain act except perhaps in transactions
,involving contracts.90
V. CON9CLUSION
The new long-arm statute reflects a substantial departure from the restrictive
concept of personal jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff. The legislature has
recognized the need to open the 'Missouiri courts to its own residents whose rights
and liabilities are affected by the activities of a complex commercial world that
ignores state boundaries. The framework for extending jurisdiction over nion-
residents has been provided. Although the reach of the statute has not been pre-
cisely defined, the spirit of the'act is self-evident. The refinements await judicial
determination.
H~Aivn' L. KAPLAN
89. Jackman v. Century Brick Corp. of America, 412 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1967).
The cause of action here arose after the enactment of § 351.630, RSMo 1961 Supp.
(foreign corporation committing tort in state) but before the enactment of §
351.633, RSMo 1965 Supp. which left the former unchanged except for requirements
of notice in the service of process.
90. For transactions covered by the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 400.1-105,
RSMo 1965 Supp. allows the parties to choose the applicable law in their contract
.4s long as that state bears some reasonable relation to the transactions. If the
parties so agree, the exercise of jurisdiction in a particular forum would have no
bearing whatsoever on the legal rights and liabilities arising out of the transaction.
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